We apply insights from the burgeoning literature on pre-entry ecologies to make sense of empirical anomalies in tests of density delay theory. Using logical formalization, we synthesize arguments of both theory fragments into a single, logically sound framework. Our results suggest that atypical patterns of density delay may occur in populations that are not yet fully legitimized and may possibly relate to the number of organizers concurrently present in the pre-entry stages.
It has been widely established that the conditions under which organizations are founded have lasting effects on their structure and performance. Stinchcombe (1965) , for instance, observed that environmental conditions get reflected in organizations in their formative years and that these organizational features persist over time so that organizations founded at different points in time are likely to have dissimilar features. Although this so-called imprinting effect may manifest itself in various ways (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Carroll & Huo, 1986; Lomi & Larsen, 1998) , the model that perhaps has been most widely applied in capturing this phenomenon is that of density delay (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) . This model tests the idea that initial founding conditions explain survival chances later in an organization's life. Specifically, it predicts that organizations founded in environments with a large number of competitors (high density) will have a persistently higher mortality hazard throughout their existence. Strong support for this thesis has been found in many empirical studies (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Nú ñ ez-Nickel & Moyano-Fuentes, 2004 ). Carroll and Hannan, after reviewing the literature linking density at founding and mortality, noted that "the estimated effect of density at founding is nearly always positive and significant " (2000: 243) .
Nevertheless, a number of studies have failed to provide support for the density delay model. McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, and Khessina's (2003) study of disk array producers worldwide between 1986 and 1998 did not show any statistically significant relationship between density at founding and mortality; similarly, no density delay effect was found in Bogaert, Boone, and Carroll's (2006) recent study of Dutch audit firms; in Carroll and Swaminathan's (1992) analysis of microbreweries in the United States; in Dobrev, Ozdemir, and Teo's (2006) study of financial cooperatives in Singapore; and in Wholey, Christianson, and Sanchez's (1992) study of health maintenance organizations in the United States. Aldrich, Zimmer, Staber, and Beggs (1994) and Barnett (1997) even found that higher densities at founding significantly lowered the mortality hazard in their studies of American trade associations and telephone companies in Pennsylvania, respectively.
These findings suggest that the density delay model in its present form does not apply to all populations in all conditions. However, rather than discarding the model altogether, a more fruitful approach would be to refine the density delay model by formally specifying scope conWe are grateful to guest editors Lá szló Pólos and Olav Sorenson as well as three anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful suggestions. This research was supported by grants from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and by Hong Kong Research Grants Council Competitive Earmarked Grant HKUST6196/04H. ditions under which density at founding deteriorates organizational life chances. By doing so, we treat density delay as a model with possible exceptions-a general pattern that can be overridden when more specific information becomes available (Hannan, Pó los, & Carroll, 2007) . Yet this approach requires deeper insight into the imprinting process at founding and the conditions under which this takes place.
In recent years organizational research has increasingly addressed pre-entry ecologiesthe notion that ecological dynamics affect new ventures as they move toward the start of business activity (Carroll & Hannan, 2000: 339 -356; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Onder & Usdiken, 2006; Ruef, 2006; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990; Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Sørensen & Sorenson, 2003) . Research on pre-entry ecologies can add value to the density delay model in several ways. First, the main focus of density delay has been limited to arguments about competition (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Carroll, 1992) , whereas pre-entry ecology arguments also consider the effects of legitimacy (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Rao, 2001; Ruef, 2006) . Second, researchers investigating density delay normally measure density at founding (a single point in time), whereas arguments about pre-entry ecologies consider populations over the full length of the organizing stage. This may be relevant because imprinting may take place over the length of the organizing period, rather than at a single point in time. Third, density delay focuses on the number of organizations in operation, whereas pre-entry ecology studies usually also take into account the number of organizers-another aspect that may enrich the model of density delay (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Kuilman & Li, 2006) .
We build formal theoretical representations of arguments underlying the theory of density delay as well as pre-entry ecology using a nonmonotonic logic developed by Hannan et al. (2007) . Formal logic allows us to recast current explanations for density delay, supplemented with insights from the pre-entry ecology literature, in a sharper language and, subsequently, to synthesize the two fragments into a single, logically sound framework. Aside from bringing together the theory fragments of pre-entry ecologies and density delay (which should stimulate research in both areas), a main contribution of building this framework is that it allows us to distinguish those cases in which the effects of the density delay follow as predicted (Carroll & Hannan, 1989 ) from those cases that deviate from this general model (Aldrich et al., 1994; Barnett, 1997; Bogaert et al., 2006; Carroll & Swaminathan, 1992; Dobrev et al., 2006; McKendrick et al., 2003; Wholey et al., 1992) .
The paper is organized as follows. We start by first briefly reviewing the literature on both density delay and pre-entry ecology. Next, we provide an introduction to the nonmonotonic logic proposed by Hannan et al. (2007) . Applying this nonmonotonic logic, we then proceed with our formalization of theoretical arguments in each of the theory fragments and their respective organizational outcomes (i.e., transition likelihoods for pre-entry ecology and postentry mortality rates for density delay). After reflecting on our findings, we discuss some implications for future empirical research.
DENSITY DELAY
The theory of density delay was inspired by the work of Leslie (1959) , who showed that at least some part of the variation in human mortality rates could be explained by conditions at birth, which resulted in a persistently higher mortality hazard. This idea was translated to the organizational context, as a specific form of organizational imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965) , by including a measure of density at founding (the start of business activity) in models of organizational mortality (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . This proved to be helpful as an explanation for postpeak decreases in the number of organizations in industrial life cycles. Organizations that were founded at the peak of a life cycle were shown to have a higher mortality hazard that would persist even after the number of organizations had declined (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . On the other hand, the density delay model would imply that, with a declining density, new organizations would be founded with a persistently lower mortality hazard, which, in turn, would lead to an upsurge in the number of organizations. The model would thus tend to produce cycles, rather than the continuous decline that is often observed, so density delay turned out to only partly explain population decline after a peak.
Nevertheless, including density delay improved predictions in that the majority of eco-logical studies that included density at founding in their models found a statistically significant positive relationship with organizational failure rates (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Nú ñ ez-Nickel & Moyano-Fuentes, 2004 ). Carroll and Hannan (1989) offered two explanations for this empirical finding. The first invokes a "liability of resource scarcity": high levels of competition will lead to scarcity in the resource environment. Scarcity, in turn, provides nascent entrepreneurs with fewer resources with which to build their organizations. Because it is difficult, once established, to recover from such deprived initial organizing, organizational failure rates tend to be persistently high.
The second argument invokes the image of a "push to the margin," where organizers, seeking entry into a market with "tightly packed niches," are forced to build their organization on the periphery of the market, where it is more difficult to get hold of valuable resources. Operating in such environments, the new organizations get stuck in routines that do not allow them to operate in the more fecund areas of the market space later on.
Although arguments explaining the density delay pattern are detailed and hint at some important aspects of the organizing stages, including competitive conditions and resource mobilization, they can be supplemented with insights from pre-entry ecology studies in important ways, as we indicate next.
PRE-ENTRY ECOLOGIES
Studies of pre-entry ecology (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Carroll & Khessina, 2005; Jovanovic, 2004; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Onder & Usdiken, 2006; Ruef, 2006; Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Sørensen & Sorenson, 2003) typically investigate the organizing stages in the launching of a new venture, from the beginning of the organizing attempt to the start of operations-in particular, how these organizing stages are affected by competitive dynamics. The launch of the organizing attempt is seen as the first serious sign of the intent to set up an organization, often the moment when a founder actually starts investing in the venture by foregoing more remunerative activities (Jovanovic, 2004) . It has been marked empirically by such events as filing an application to set up an organization (Sørensen & Sorenson, 2003) , legally incorporating (Onder & Usdiken, 2006) , and developing a product prototype (Rao, 2001) . Operational start-up, in turn, refers to actual entry into the population of fully operational organizations and has been marked empirically by an organization's first product shipment ) and the moment at which an organization starts to offer revenue-generating services (Kuilman & Li, 2006) . The time between these two events is referred to as waiting time or, alternatively, the gestation period (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) . A fundamental theme in the literature on pre-entry ecologies is that during this waiting time the organizer (also referred to as a preproducer by Carroll & Hannan [2000] or a preoperational entrant by Ruef [2006] ) is operating in an environment populated both by other organizers and by future competitors already in operation. Preentry ecology studies address how these other organizers and established organizations affect the likelihood that the nascent organization will reach the operational phase, both through competitive pressure and legitimation effects.
One of the more attractive features of this approach is that it elucidates the founding process by explicitly defining a risk set of organizers and studying their possible transition into an organizational population. Such an approach promises to illuminate competitive and social interactions during these organizing stages and, potentially, to illuminate the early process of identity formation (Hannan et al., 2007) . Thus, it can offer insights beyond those available through earlier founding rate studies, which treated foundings as events that occurred within an undefined pool of potential entrepreneurs.
Pre-entry ecology, compared to the density delay model, places more emphasis on the effect of the presence of other organizers (organizer density) than on organizational density only. It also considers legitimation effects to be important during the organizing stages. Additionally, it considers these effects to occur over the full length of the organizing stages. These issues form the starting point for our logical formalization.
THEORETICAL METHODS
One approach to bringing together the theoretical insights of density delay and pre-entry ecology, and to shedding light on empirical anomalies in studies of density delay, is to make use of logical formalization. There are at least three reasons for using formal logic (Bruggeman & Vermeulen, 2002; Hannan, Carroll, & Pó los, 2003) . First, employing formal logic should elucidate patterns of argumentation. Through a process of rational reconstruction, such arguments allow scholars to trace back a particular conclusion to its original premises and, if necessary, to point out aspects that require reconsideration (Bruggeman & Vermeulen, 2002 (Hannan et al., 2003) . Third, logic often makes it possible to deduce new and testable implications. It also occasionally yields unforeseen conclusions from integrating various theory fragments and empirical results. For instance, Pó los and Hannan (2002) were able to deduce and then demonstrate a positive relationship between age and organizational mortality after integrating various theory fragments in this area that pointed in disparate directions. This finding was not only an unforeseen logical outcome but also helped to explain the results of a number of empirical studies that had begun to point in the direction of positive age dependence.
Our study formalizes the various theoretical arguments by employing the Language for Theory Building (LTB) developed by Hannan et al. (2007) . LTB is a nonmonotonic logic. Whereas in monotonic logic (e.g., first-order logic) adding premises to a set of arguments either confirms initial conclusions or rejects the entire theory, in nonmonotonic logic adding premises may instead yield an improved specification of the initial conclusion. In LTB, nonmonotonicity is made possible by a specificity ordering; if one statement is more generic than the other, the more generic statement does not need to be discarded-and may still apply to the full domain as a general rule-whereas the more specific argument overrides the general rule within the more restricted domain to which it applies. In other words, rules with exceptions are allowed. Allowing for exceptions, as Hannan et al. (2007) explain, is appropriate given the nature of social scientific inquiry. In addition, it makes efforts to link distinct theory fragments more feasible. The latter feature is important, because a central reason to engage in logical formalization of natural language theories is that it brings closer the prospect of theory unification and, thus, the potential integration and accumulation of ideas and knowledge from different theories, different scholars, and even from entirely different research fields (Pé li, Bruggeman, Masuch, & Ó Nuallá in, 1994) . Although these possibilities have thus far not been pursued by many, in a couple of instances organization ecologists have managed to fruitfully establish formal logical links between their theory fragments (Hannan et al., 2007) . These successful attempts at theory cross-fertilization were greatly facilitated by the relative lenience of nonmonotonic logic with respect to allowing apparent inconsistencies.
1

ORGANIZATION DENSITY
Our formalization begins by addressing the core of density delay theory: organization density, by affecting the accessibility of resources at the time of founding, has an enduring effect on survival chances of new entrants. To start out, two arguments can be made in support of a positive effect of organization density on resource mobilization at the time of founding. The first is that existing firms provide a training ground for potential entrepreneurs (Hannan & Freeman, 1987; Marrett, 1980; Sorenson & Audia, 2000) . These potential entrepreneurs may use their inside knowledge about the strategies and structures of the existing firms, as well as the social networks they developed at these firms, as resources to construct a new venture. Freeman (1983) referred to this as organizationally induced entrepreneurship. When the density of operational organizations is higher, more training grounds are available, which increases the potential for resource mobilization. In addition, a higher organization density in a population enhances the legitimacy of its corresponding organizational form. We define legitimacy as the extent to which a social entity is recognized and taken for granted (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . Growing legitimacy of an organizational form ensures that more resources will be available to organizations being founded (Hannan & Free-man, 1987) . When a particular form of organization is widely understood, external audiences are more likely to support the creation of additional organizations conforming to that familiar form.
Let x and xЈ be organizers, and let t and tЈ be points in time. Furthermore, let PopDens(x, t) denote the density in the organizational population that aspiring population member x is faced with at a time t, and let Scar(x, t) denote the expected resource scarcity that x experiences at t. (See Table 1 for definitions of the logical symbols, as well as for precise definitions of the functions used.)
Postulate 1: Increasing organization density reduces resource scarcity for organizers.
Postulate 1, as is the case for the remainder of the formal argument presented here, is specified at the firm-or, better, aspiring firm-level. In other words, the postulate relates environmental conditions, such as density and scarcity, to individual organizers, not to populations. Environmental conditions change over time, so, in addition, they are related to time points. All organizers in the model are considered to be part of the same organizer population. Note that Postulate 1 allows time t to precede tЈ or vice versa; as a result, it pertains both to conditions of increasing and decreasing population density. Formally, t and tЈ might even refer to the same point in time, but then PopDens(x, t) and PopDens(xЈ, tЈ) would be equal as well. The postulate furthermore allows organizer x to either differ from, or to be equal to, xЈ. Note that for reasons of conciseness we do not use predicates to explicitly assign x and xЈ to the set of organizers and t and tЈ to the set of time points. These assignments are built into the definitions of functions PopDens and Scar.
Rather than stressing positive effects of organization density, accounts of the density delay model focus only on the constraining effects of The number of organizers that organizer x is faced with at time t PopDens (x, t) The number of organizations in the target operational population that aspiring population member x is faced with at time t Scar (x, t) The expected resource scarcity that organizer x experiences at time t AttRG (x, t) The expected attention allocated to gathering resources by organizer x at time t
OB(x)
The expected quality of the organizational structure at the end of organizing by organizer
The pre-entry waiting time-i.e., the time organizer x has spent in the organizing stages
The expected alignment of the organizational structure that organizer x has built TL(x)
The expected transition likelihood for organizer x PostMH(x)
The expected postentry mortality hazard for organizer x Name constants T* The point in the organizing period beyond which misalignment starts to set in N*
The number of organizations beyond which competition becomes dominant M* The number of organizers beyond which competition becomes dominant Relations x Ͼ xЈ x is greater than xЈ x Ն xЈ x is greater than or equal to xЈ x Ͻ xЈ x is smaller than xЈ x Յ xЈ x is smaller than or equal to xЈ organization density (Carroll & Hannan, 1989 , 2000 Lomi & Larsen, 1998) . That is, if a larger number of organizations are already in operation, fewer resources will be available to new organizers, creating conditions of resource scarcity that will continue to affect organizers even after they enter the operational population. In their study of pre-entry activity in the U.S. television broadcast industry between 1965 and 1987, Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) concluded that the number of independent stations already broadcasting negatively affected the ability of aspiring station organizers to acquire equipment, erect new broadcasting towers, and, subsequently, to go "on air." Han (1998) (1987: 918) . A situation with more operational organizations thus poses a greater demand on the resource environment. In addition, following the tight niche packing argument (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) , in densely populated markets organizers will tend to set up their organizations on the periphery of the market in order to avoid direct competition with existing firms. This implies that organizers will choose niches on the more inferior margins of the resource space, where resources are more thinly spread and/or ephemeral. The lack of suitable resources there inhibits these organizers from building up routines (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) .
Postulate 2: Increasing organization density induces resource scarcity for organizers.
In formalizing this argument, we consider the flow of organizer resources to be finite. In addition, organizational ecology normally assumes a stable carrying capacity-that is, a fixed limit on the number of organizations a competitive environment is able to sustain (but see Lomi, Larsen, & Freeman, 2005) . We assume, furthermore, that each organization imposes a similar impact on scarcity (e.g., binds the same resource); therefore, the existence of higher numbers of organizations will make resources for individual organizers harder to obtain. The same assumptions will apply to our formalization of the effects of organizer density in the next section. For reasons of conciseness, we do not explicate this reasoning by adding, as an extra precondition, the existence of a stable carrying capacity to our formal arguments.
When inspecting Postulates 1 and 2, it becomes immediately clear that they are, at least from the perspective of classical logical languages (e.g., first-order logic), in simple contradiction: they relate opposing consequents to the same antecedent. In contrast to classical logics, nonmonotonic logical languages, such as LTB (Hannan et al., 2007) , implement a lenient view of opposing postulates. Instead of yielding a contradiction and thus rendering the entire theory contradictory, LTB draws no conclusions and leaves the remainder of the theory untouched. Essentially, both opposing postulates are ignored. But LTB facilitates another, more productive approach that builds on the idea that more specific postulates precede more general postulates. By assessing the relative specificity of both postulates, we may still be able to derive conclusions from them.
In order to do so, we resort to an ecological theory that specifically focuses on the relationship between organization density and resource availability: density dependence (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . According to the density dependence model, at low densities the legitimizing effect on organizational entry will exceed the effect of competition. As density increases, the legitimizing effect will increase at a decreasing rate, whereas the constraining effect will accelerate (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . As a consequence, population density will have a positive effect on resource availability at low densities, but when density reaches a degree at which the organizational form is generally taken for granted by resource providers, higher organization density will only reduce resource availability.
In order to solve the seeming contradiction between Postulates 1 and 2, we make use of this reasoning and assume that increased population density reduces scarcity up to some value N*, beyond which the effect reverses.
Postulate 1*: At low densities, at which the population has not yet become taken for granted, increasing organization density reduces resource scarcity for organizers.
Postulate 2*: At high densities, at which the population has become taken for granted, increasing organization density induces resource scarcity for organizers.
Note that Postulates 1* and 2*, even jointly, do not cover all instances of PopDens. Specifically, if organization densities at time points t and tЈ are on opposite sides of N*, neither postulate applies. In such instances scarcity may either increase or decrease with organization density. Note, furthermore, that Postulates 1* and 2* are more specific than, respectively, Postulates 1 and 2 and, thus, will precede the latter in later derivations.
ORGANIZER DENSITY
Next, our formalization considers organizer density (the number of organizers), a main variable of interest in studies of pre-entry ecologies (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Kuilman & Li, 2006) , and its relationship with the resource environment from which a given organizer has to draw. A first argument, advanced by Carroll and Hannan (2000) , is that an increased presence of preoperational entrants may generate more legitimacy for their organizing efforts. According to Carroll and Hannan (2000: 344) , organizers likely interact with influential social actors, such as banks and regulatory agencies. This interaction includes them in a social network that enables collective action and collective learning. So, when organizer density increases, a social movement-like community could come into existence that would facilitate external audiences in recognizing and identifying the pertaining organizational form (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) , which, in turn, would promote the availability of resources.
Let Dens(x,t) denote the number of organizers that organizer x is faced with at time t.
Postulate 3: Increasing organizer density reduces resource scarcity for organizers.
However, negative effects of organizer density on resource availability have also been reported. Ruef (2006) , in his study of U.S. medical schools between 1765 and 1930, noted that a greater number of concurrent entries would have been expected to lead to scarcity in some important resources for aspiring medical schools, such as financing, goodwill, philanthropy, and staff.
Also, the coexistence of large numbers of organizers may lead to situations in which aspiring organizations are increasingly being forced to exploit inferior regions of the resource space. In these regions useful resources are more thinly spread and/or ephemeral (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) . In terms of human resources, for example, as the number of aspiring organizations increases, it will become more difficult to recruit experienced and qualified employees. As a result, an organizer may be forced to draw from peripheral and less suitable parts of the labor market and to select employees that have less relevant skills, knowledge, and abilities.
Postulate 4: Increasing organizer density induces resource scarcity for organizers.
Again, we are faced with a situation in which two postulates (Postulates 3 and 4) would contradict from the perspective of classical logic. We solve this seeming contradiction in a similar way by updating the theory with two-more specific-alternatives to Propositions 3 and 4. Alter-native Propositions 3* and 4* imply that increased organizer density reduces the expected resource scarcity up to some value M*, at which the organizers are by and large legitimized, and beyond which the effect reverses. 
It is important to note that the values at which the relationship between density and scarcity changes direction may be entirely different for organizer and organizational populations. In addition, the value of M* may not only be different from N* but may also be reached at an entirely different point in time. On the one hand, founders are often fairly secretive about their venture during the organizing stages (Ruef, 2006) . Owing to their low visibility, they will not contribute much to the legitimation of their organizer population, thus slowing down the legitimation process. On the other hand, organizer resource providers are often professionals in recognizing business potential; consequently, they may be relatively fast in legitimizing innovative organizer forms. Note that if, of the two values M* and N*, one has been reached while the other has not, only situations in which organizer density and organization density change in opposite directions will warrant a conclusion on the direction of change in resource scarcity; conversely, if both densities are either below or above their "critical" values, they should move in unison in order to warrant definite predictions on resource scarcity. Figure 1 shows the interaction between organizer and population density with respect to resource scarcity, as well as the domains in which Postulates 1* through 4* do and do not apply.
CONSEQUENTS FOR ORGANIZATION BUILDING
Onder and Usdiken (2006), in their study of trade union foundings in Istanbul from 1968 to 1980, considered aspiring trade unions to be in the organizing stages from the moment of legal incorporation (signaling the founding attempt) to the first general council meeting (signaling successful founding). To be able to set up a council meeting and move from the organizing stages to the operational stages, a trade union needed to recruit members. Without being able to acquire the most important resource (i.e., membership dues), a general council meeting was unlikely.
In general, both the scarcity and tightness of niche packing conditions will lead organizers to spend a large proportion of their time on gathering the necessary financial, human, and material resources. With fewer such resources available, and when they have a positional disadvantage in obtaining such resources following a tight niche packing, organizers have to devote relatively more attention to securing funds, selecting the right employees and suppliers, and identifying a suitable set of potential customers for their product or service. In addition, those resources actually obtained may be of inferior quality. For example, organizers may be forced to hire employees who do not meet expectations in terms of knowledge, skills, or attributes. The result of this resource scarcity, thus, is that not only will organizers have less time to spend on building a more institutionalized structure, planning methodically, adopting a legal structure, and creating an informal social structure (Ruef, 2002) but the quality of the organization that is being built will be negatively affected.
Let OB(x) denote the overall quality of the organizational structure that organizer x has developed by the end of the organizing period.
Postulate 5: When resources for organization building are scarce, organizers end up with less well-developed organization structures.
ᑨ x, xЈ, t, tЈ ͓(Scar(x, t) Ͼ Scar(xЈ, tЈ))
(OB(x) Ͻ OB(xЈ))͔
Postulate 5, which associates the quality of the outcome of the organizing process with individual prior times of scarcity, is based on the assumption that poor organizing early in the pre-entry period is hard to recover from later in the pre-entry period (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) . We therefore consider organizing to be an incremental activity, where structure is built on structure. For instance, under conditions of initial resource scarcity, once investments in equipment of inferior quality are made and less than ideal employees are hired, inertia and switching costs may prevent the organizer from undoing this poor organizing, even when later in the pre-entry period the organizer is facing a more abundant resource environment. So, once an organization is poorly set up, it may be hard to effectively restructure it later (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) .
WAITING TIMES
So far, we have discussed two sources of competitive pressure: other organizers and organizations already in operation. The time during which nascent entrepreneurs are exposed to such competitive pressures can be long. Ruef (2006) , for example, in his study of U.S. medical schools between 1766 and 1930, reported that waiting times (measured as the total time between announcing the school and operational start-up) could last as long as twenty-six years, with an average waiting time of about two years. Schoonhoven et al. (1990) reported waiting times for semiconductor firms of more than four years (mean duration almost two years). Kuilman and Li (2006) reported that, among foreign banks in Shanghai, waiting times extended to thirteen years, with an average of four-and-ahalf years. Ruef (2006) argued that a longer period of gestation will result in some clear benefits, the most tangible of which are related to the organizational structure (the opportunity to include more elements of the industry's dominant design) and to the scale of the aspiring organization (e.g., the opportunity to attract a larger staff). Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel, and Tsai (1996) associated a longer preproduction period with more time to develop formal plans, intended as blueprints for future action. An extended preproduction period will thus result in a better developed (more reliable and accountable) organization structure. Let WT(x) denote the pre-entry waiting timethat is, the time organizer x has spent in the organizing stages.
Postulate 6: Longer pre-entry waiting times induce better built organizational structures.
ᑨ x, xЈ ͓(WT( x) Ͻ WT( xЈ))
(OB( x) Ͻ OB( xЈ))͔
Postulate 6 describes a positive relationship between waiting time and organizational development. A countertendency, however, is that while the "internal fitness" of an aspiring organization may increase with the length of the gestation period, with longer waiting times, the utility of the organization that is being built may decline-that is, the "external fitness" may be reduced.
2 Hannan and Freeman (1989: 122) noted that limited foresight might prevent organizers from building an organization that is perfectly aligned with its environment by the time the venture moves into operation. If plans are too rigid, this misalignment may increase with the length of the waiting time, since it becomes increasingly difficult to predict which strategy and structure will be most effective by the time of entry. Schoonhoven et al. (1990) made a similar argument, noting that organizers who spend too much time in the pre-entry stages can lose out to their competitors. Jelinek and Schoonhoven quote a former senior executive of National Semiconductor Inc., who stated, "Time is a real fact, and it is an awesome fact. If you get the product out six months [later] , even though it may be better, the market may be lost, and so you have failed " (1990: 314) . Losing out to competitors implies that the organizer is no longer attuned to and aligned with a changing market.
An additional possibility concerns the relationship between the organizer and external audiences (e.g., investors). During the gestation period, an organizer may well be subject to the scrutiny of an external audience (Hannan et al., 2007) . When the gestation period becomes too lengthy, the audience might lose interest in the aspiring organization and/or the organizer might lose credibility since the long waiting time might signal that the organization is having difficulty taking off. Hannan (1998) , however, assumed that for operational organizations, at first, their slowly decreasing alignment with the environment does not affect organizational outcomes. Only beyond some threshold point in time does the lack of alignment become a potential hazard. Postulate 7 assumes similar dynamics for nascent organizations-their alignment decreases after some initial period of time. Hannan and Freeman indeed noted that the "ability to forecast the future declines with the length of the forecast period, probably exponentially" (1989: 122; emphasis added), suggesting that the misalignment problem may only become significant after the passing of a positive initial waiting period, here denoted by T*.
Let Align(x) denote the expected alignment of the organizational structure of member x at the end of its organizing period.
Postulate 7: Beyond some initial waiting period, longer pre-entry waiting times reduce organizational alignment.
Postulate 7 implicitly assumes that environmental conditions will not be stable after T*, because during periods of stability the level of alignment will not decrease with the length of the waiting time. If there were any period of stability (if completely stable situations did ex-ist), this postulate would only allow it to occur before T*.
Taken together, Postulate 6 and the more restricted Postulate 7 describe an important tradeoff that entrepreneurs are faced with in the organizing stages (Pé li & Bruggeman, 2007) with respect to the time intersection of these postulates' antecedents. On the one hand, organizers can choose to spend a long time in the gestation period to allow for the proper development of their organizational structure and to become an efficient producer. On the other hand, organizers may choose to start reaping the benefits of still being well-aligned with the environment and to seek first mover advantages (Pé li & Bruggeman, 2007) . We note here that the first mover versus efficient producer trade-off is strongly linked to the value of T*, which, in turn, may depend on the nature of the industry the organizer aspires to enter and the type of technologies that are dominant in that particular industry. We would expect that the onset of a reduction in organizational alignment would occur after a much shorter waiting time in, for example, the rapidly changing software industry, compared to organizing stages set in the presumably more stable banking industry. Correspondingly, the tradeoff might lean toward strong first mover advantages in the first industry, whereas there might be more time available for organization building in the latter.
3
ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES Transition Likelihood from Organizer to Operational Organization
The two organizational outcomes that we seek to formalize in this study are the transition likelihood (the key variable of interest in pre-entry ecology studies) and the postentry mortality hazard (the outcome variable of the density delay model). Starting with the former, we define a firm's transition likelihood at a particular point in real time as its likelihood of moving from pre-entry to operations at that time. The likelihood a nascent organization will become operational should be expected to increase with its level of maturity and development. Regulatory agencies in financial markets are much more likely to provide an operating license to a preoperational bank if it satisfies all requirements (Kuilman & Li, 2006) . A medical school is more likely to open its doors for students when its curriculum is in place and its faculty is hired (Ruef, 2006 
From Postulates 6 and 8 we offer the following.
Theorem 1: Longer pre-entry waiting times induce transition likelihoods among organizers.
ᑪ x, xЈ ͓(WT( x) Ͻ WT( xЈ)) 3 (TL( x) Ͻ TL( xЈ))͔
A countertendency, however, is that with longer waiting times the alignment of a firm's preparations with the demands of its environment may decline, as projected by Postulate 7. For reasons explicated above, if an organizer is no longer aligned with its environment, then at least minimally rational constituents will withdraw their support for the aspiring organization. This, in turn, may lead to a slimmer probability that organizers will reach the operational stages.
Postulate 9: Organizations that are better aligned have higher transition likelihoods.
From Postulates 7 and 9 we offer the following.
Theorem 2: Beyond some point T*, longer pre-entry waiting times reduce transition likelihoods among organizers.
ᑪ x, xЈ ͓(T* Յ WT( x) Ͻ WT( xЈ))
(TL( x) Ͼ TL( xЈ))͔
Note that Theorem 2 takes precedence over Theorem 1 because it is more specific. As a result, the relationship between waiting time and transition likelihood before T* is left unspecified, whereas the relationship beyond T* is negative. Several empirical studies have found an inverted U-shaped relationship between waiting time and the transition likelihood (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Schoonhoven et al., 1990) . This suggests that, before T*, longer waiting time may improve alignment, for example, because it may allow the organizer to adapt his or her original idea to current conditions in the market. With respect to the timing of T*, Carroll and Hannan (2000) observed a peak transition likelihood after approximately six years, while Kuilman and Li (2006) estimated the threshold T* to lie somewhere between seven and eleven years. In Schoonhoven et al.'s (1990) study of semiconductor firms, the peak transition likelihood occurred much earlier, after about two-and-a-half years.
Regarding the effects of the density of already operational organizations on the transition likelihood among organizers, we can derive the following theorem (based on Postulates 1*, 5, and 8).
Theorem 3: At low densities, increasing organization density induces transition likelihoods among organizers.
Similarly, we can base Theorem 4 on postulates 2*, 5, and 8.
Theorem 4: At high densities, increasing organization density reduces transition likelihoods among organizers.
The combination of Theorems 3 and 4 yields the inverted U-shaped relationship between population density and the transition likelihood that has been found in empirical studies of preentry ecologies (Kuilman & Li, 2006; Rao, 2001) .
Regarding the relationship between organizer density and the transition likelihood, we can now derive Theorem 5 by applying the cut rule via Postulates 3*, 5, and 8.
Theorem 5: At low densities, increasing organizer density induces transition likelihoods among organizers.
Furthermore, Theorem 6 follows from Postulates 4*, 5, and 8.
Theorem 6: At high densities, increasing organizer density reduces transition likelihoods among organizers.
According to Theorems 5 and 6, the likelihood of moving to the operational stages will first increase with the organizer density but, as the number of active organizers increases beyond threshold M*, it will become increasingly difficult to move from the preoperational stages into operations. Carroll and Hannan (2000) found strong support for this prediction. In their study of automobile preproducers, preproducer density showed an inverted U-shaped relationship with the likelihood of reaching the operational stages. Kuilman and Li (2006) , in contrast, were only able to confirm Theorem 6 in their study of foreign banks in Shanghai. Their results showed that the number of organizers in geographic proximity had a particularly strong negative correlation with transition probabilities. They found no legitimation effects for organizer density in their study, however. This result may well be due to the fact that their observation window started after a significant organizer population had already emerged (i.e., the organizer population had possibly already exceeded M*) and an organizational population was still absent.
Postentry Mortality Hazard
Now consider the organizational outcome in the density delay model: the postentry mortality hazard. We define the postentry mortality hazard as the likelihood that, at a given time, an individual organization, having formerly sur-vived the organizing stages, will drop out of the population of operational organizations.
Postulate 6 suggests that firms that have spent more time in the pre-entry stages have had more time to build a more apposite structure. Hannan and Freeman (1984) furthermore demonstrated that organizations tend to display high structural inertia, suggesting that much of the structure developed during the early stages of an organization's gestation will be preserved in later stages. Hence, more suitable structures designed in the pre-entry stages will lower a firm's mortality hazard later.
In terms of the formalization, all prior postulates relate environmental conditions to pre-entry times. In order to facilitate drawing inferences about outcomes, these must be related to pre-entry times as well-even if they (as is the case with postentry mortality) manifest themselves only after the organizing stages are over. The formal argument thus relates mortality-traces it back-to the pre-entry situation.
Let PostMH(x) denote x's expected mortality hazard in an (arbitrary) time window after founding.
Postulate 10: Organizers with better built organizational structures have lower postentry mortality hazards.
Applying the cut rule to Postulates 6 and 10 yields the following.
Theorem 7: Longer pre-entry waiting times reduce postentry mortality hazards.
The results of several studies provide empirical support for Theorem 7. Such research (Carroll et al., 1996; Klepper, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000; Ruef, 2006) shows that the length of the pre-entry waiting time has enduring effects on organizational performance. Carroll et al. (1996) , for instance, in their study of preproduction activities in the U.S. automobile industry between 1885 and 1981, found that start-ups that spent a longer time in preproduction mode experienced lower mortality rates after their entry into the population. Similarly, Ruef's (2006) study of U.S. medical schools shows that institutions that spent more time in the preoperational stages were less likely to close down or be acquired at a later stage. His estimates imply that a school with a pre-entry waiting time of four years had a postentry exit rate only half that of a school with no observable waiting time.
Above we stated that very long waiting times may cause firms to become misaligned with environmental demands (Postulate 7). We argued that poorly aligned firms have lower transition rates, but what happens with the misaligned firms that, for one reason or another, do manage to enter the population? It seems likely that for those organizations failing to meet audiences' demands, mortality hazards are high.
Postulate 11 captures this notion.
Postulate 11: Better aligned organizations have lower postentry mortality hazards.
Applying the cut rule to Postulates 8 and 11 yields the following.
Theorem 8: Beyond some point T*, longer pre-entry waiting times induce postentry mortality hazards.
Theorem 8 is another instance in which LTB's nonmonotonicity is helpful. Courtesy of LTB's specificity ordering, Theorem 7, a more general claim relating waiting times to mortality hazards, and Theorem 8, describing the effects of particularly long waiting times on mortality, can coexist. When waiting times exceed T*, Theorem 8 applies and postentry mortality hazards increase. Before that, Theorem 7 applies and postentry mortality hazards decrease.
Also, applying the cut rule to Postulates 1*, 5, and 10 leads to the following. x, xЈ, t, tЈ ͓(PopDens(x, t) Ͻ PopDens(xЈ, tЈ) 
In addition, we can now derive the traditional, now updated formulation of density delay through Postulates 2*, 5, and 10. x, xЈ, t, tЈ ͓(PopDens(x, t) Ͼ PopDens(xЈ, tЈ) Ն N*) 3 (PostMH(x) Ͼ PostMH(xЈ))͔ Theorem 9 predicts that when density at founding is still below a threshold, N*, a higher density will actually increase survival chances, rather than decrease them, as predicted by Theorem 10. This implies that, especially during the early legitimation phase of the industry life cycle, when densities are low, this special case of density delay will show up. 4 This prediction resonates well with the observations of Winter, who noted that there may be "a substantial asymmetry . . . in the effect of density at founding depending on whether the cohort in question was founded before or after the population peak " (1990: 290) . Theorem 9 thus provides an explanation for why Aldrich et al. (1994) and Barnett (1997) , in their studies of U.S. trade associations and Pennsylvania telephone companies, respectively, found a negative relationship between density at founding and organizational failure rates, since their observation window was centered on their population's emergence.
Other studies that focused on the emergence of a population also failed to find support for density delay's traditional prediction (e.g., Bogaert et al., 2006; Dobrev et al., 2006; McKendrick et al., 2003; Wholey et al., 1992) , but they do not fully support Theorem 9 either. These studies essentially found no relationship between density at founding and failure rates. We speculate that this might have been because organizer density effects were not controlled for; organizer density could have potentially counterbalanced the effects of organization density. When organizational density is growing during the early emergence of a population, while organizer densities are increasing beyond threshold M*, aspiring organizations may not necessarily experience an increase or decrease in resource scarcity (as we showed in Figure 1 , no conclusion can be drawn from such situations). This is not an unreasonable speculation, as shown by Carroll and Hannan's (2000: 347) study of the automobile industry, where organizers outnumbered operational producers during the early stages of this population's evolution.
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Regarding the effects of organizer density on postentry mortality, applying the cut rule to Postulates 3*, 5, and 10 leads to the following. x, xЈ, t, tЈ ͓(Dens( x, t) 
Both Theorem 11 and 12 are novel predictions that, to the best of our knowledge, have never been tested empirically, but we believe-in conjunction with organization density at foundingthat they could sharpen the estimates of the delayed effects of organizational imprinting on the postentry mortality rate. Figure 2 presents an inference structure connecting all the postulates and theorems developed in this article.
DISCUSSION
In this study we have attempted to bring together two theory fragments from organizational ecology-namely, theories of density delay (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Carroll, 1992 ) and pre-entry ecological dynamics (Carroll & Hannan, 2000: 339 -356; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Onder & Usdiken, 2006; Ruef, 2006; Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Sine et al., 2007; Sørensen & Sorenson, 2003) -to shed light on an empirical anomaly in studies of density delay: a number of studies have failed to support this model (Bogaert et al., 2006; Carroll & Swaminathan, 1992; Dobrev et al., 2006; McKendrick et al., 2003; Wholey et al., 1992) or even to find instances in which density at founding actually improves survival chances (Aldrich et al., 1994; Barnett, 1997) . Our formalization shows that in situations in which a population has not yet reached a level of taken-for-grantedness (as evidenced by the density of its members and aspiring members), we FIGURE 2 Inference Structure: Theorems and Underlying Postulates might indeed fail to find the typical pattern of density delay. This appears to account for most if not all of the studies that disconfirm density delay. We find it striking that all of the studies listed here do indeed tend to focus on the emergence phase of their chosen populations. We suspect that further disentangling the effects of waiting time, organizer density, and organization density (see also our suggestions for future empirical research below) could potentially bring out more cases in which increasing organization density at founding actually improves survival rates.
Any positive effect on an organization's survival chances resulting from higher density during the organizing stages should be distinct from, and complementary to, an alternative phenomenon-namely, the trial-by-fire model proposed by Swaminathan (1996) . This model, which we have excluded from this formalization for reasons of parsimony, considers two possible mechanisms that actually lead to lower mortality rates over time: unobserved heterogeneity in frailty among new organizations and population-level learning. According to the first, "adverse founding conditions may eliminate the inherently weaker, or more frail, organizations quickly, leaving behind a surviving cohort of inherently stronger, less frail, organizations" (Swaminathan, 1996 (Swaminathan, : 1351 . According to the second, "adverse conditions feature a high organizational failure rate and thus afford greater opportunities for population-level learning (Miner & Haunschild, 1995) " (Swaminathan, 1996 (Swaminathan, : 1351 . Swaminathan (1996) found evidence that organizations founded in adverse environments experienced higher initial postentry mortality rates (which is consistent with Carroll & Hannan, 1989 ), but, beyond a certain age, survivors among such organizations indeed had mortality rates that were lower than those of organizations founded in less adverse environments. In other words, the effect of starting out in adverse circumstances weakened significantly faster with organization age for those organizations that survived the initial trial by fire.
Although our approach is clearly different, since we make no specific inferences about the age-dependent nature of the postentry mortality hazard, we view it as potentially complementary to that of Swaminathan (1996) because our logical formalization could be extended to account for the effects of frailty and populationlevel learning. Formalizing such arguments would be an obvious next step in more comprehensively capturing the persistent effects of founding conditions. This study's formalization efforts suggest a number of implications for designing future empirical research. First, a test of the relationship between founding conditions and mortality rates must not only consider the density of operational organizations (as per the traditional density delay model) but also the density of aspiring organizations and the time spent in the organizing stages. In particular, this study encourages researchers to test for nonlinear relationships between these variables and organizational outcomes.
6 Future empirical research may also explore interactions among these variables to more comprehensively capture the initial founding conditions. It may well be that organizer density and organization density interact to jointly affect the postentry mortality hazard. Growing organization densities during the founding stages (at low levels of organization density) could, for instance, strengthen the negative relationship (at low levels of organizer density) between pre-entry organizer density and the postentry mortality hazard (see also Figure  1 ), since legitimation is likely to spill over (Dobrev et al., 2006; Kuilman & Li, in press; Ruef, 2000) from operational producers to organizers. In addition to testing the potential interaction between these different densities at founding, we would expect interactions between the length of organizing period and the densities of organizers and operational firms during this period. While longer organizing periods may yield better developed organizational structures, they also expose the organizer to competition for a longer period of time. Interaction variables might be able to bring out these different implications of longer organizing periods. 6 One reason why researchers might have refrained from doing this in the past could be because including multiple sets of nonlinear terms in the same model (which typically also test for the nonmonotonic effects of contemporaneous density) can lead to collinearity problems. Such problems can potentially be avoided by splitting up the sample or by splitting up the "density at founding" measure into two measures: one representing legitimation at founding and one representing competition at founding.
Second, recent studies have proposed refined measures of legitimacy by putting more weight on the density of organizations with a focused identity (McKendrick et al., 2003) or those with a higher grade of membership in the population (Bogaert et al., 2006; Kuilman & Li, in press ). The framework formalized here provides a platform for integrating these advances to generate additional novel predictions. For instance, it would be interesting to see whether the concept of "fuzzy density" (Bogaert et al., 2006; Hannan et al., 2007; Kuilman & Li, in press) could be used in a density delay context to study and compare the effects generated by both organizers and operational organizations. From this perspective, the presence of organizers may have an effect distinct from those stemming from operational organizations, since the former have yet to obtain a grade of membership in a population (Kuilman & Li, 2006) -an issue worth exploring in greater detail in future research.
Third, this formalization suggests that more attention needs to be paid to observation windows chosen by researchers. In particular, empirical studies that concentrate on the early stages of a population's evolution (when both organizer and organization density are still below their respective thresholds) may fail to find support for the traditional theory of density delay. These studies may even find a negative relationship between densities at founding and the organizational failure rate when these are sufficiently disentangled into the two variables that we have suggested (i.e., organizer density at founding and organization density at founding), and when there is a control variable added for the length of the organizing period.
Fourth, our effort to synthesize arguments in the literature of pre-entry ecologies with the theory of density delay not only strengthens the latter but also builds a more solid theoretical foundation for research on the former. The literature on pre-entry ecologies seeks to understand how ecological dynamics affect new ventures as they move toward the start of business activity (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 2000: 339 -356; Kuilman & Li, 2006; Onder & Usdiken, 2006; Ruef, 2006; Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Sørensen & Sorenson, 2003) . Regularities are starting to emerge from this work, but, unfortunately, there is still limited theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that generate the patterns observed and how these dynamics in the early stages affect organizational outcomes later. Carroll and Khessina, after carefully reviewing this growing body of literature, concluded that "there is a need for a better theory explaining which firms are capable of making the transition from preproduction into production and what the consequences of this transition are " (2005: 187) . With this study we hope to have provided a stronger theoretical foundation, including a set of testable hypotheses in the form of empirically falsifiable postulates and theorems, which should benefit future research in this area.
Fifth, we believe the density of organizers is an underexplored variable that deserves greater empirical scrutiny in future empirical studies. Given the fact that established organizations often function as training grounds for new ventures (Freeman, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1987; Marrett, 1980; Sorenson & Audia, 2000) and that entrepreneurs with backgrounds at established firms occasionally take with them their networks of clients and other resources, we would expect the competitive pressure on established organizations to increase with the number of organizers. In other words, organizer density may, aside from the delayed effect that we have described here, also have a contemporaneous effect on the growth and mortality rates of operational organizations.
Finally, analyzing pre-entry ecological dynamics is a useful approach for researchers wishing to avoid selection bias in terms of density (Denrell & Ková cs, 2008) or the founding rate (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993) . Founding rate studies in organizational ecology typically contain a selection bias, because only successful (i.e., realized) foundings are analyzed (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993) . In addition, as Denrell and Ková cs (2008) suggest, there may be a tendency in ecology studies to focus on populations that have some social or economic significance, such as banks or newspapers, which, in turn, generates a bias in key ecology findings. Reasons for not studying small and insignificant populations include, according to Denrell and Ková cs (2008) , a lack of observations leading to difficulty in conducting any meaningful statistical analysis. Focusing on the pre-entry stages, the more numerous social actors found there, and the selection that occurs among them may fa-cilitate a more thorough understanding of why particular populations or forms fail to emerge.
